

Juvenile Court does not lose jurisdiction to determine whether a person should be required to register as a sex offender after probation term expires. [In the Matter of R.A.](15-2-1)

On April 30, 2015, the Houston (14th Dist.) Court of Appeals concluded that Articles 62.351 and 62.352(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure supersede the Family Code and gives the Juvenile Court authority to determine sex offender registration even after a juvenile's probation has expired.

¶ 15-2-1. **In the Matter of R.A.**, No. 07-CJV-013620, __S.W.3d.___, 2015 WL 1956882 [Ct.App.—Houston (14th Dist.), April 30, 2015].

Facts: Appellant R.A. was alleged to have engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the offenses of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child. At the time of these offenses, R.A. was fourteen years old and the victim was six years old. R.A. stipulated to the truth of the allegations in the petition. In March 2008, when R.A. was fifteen years old, the trial court, sitting as a juvenile court (hereinafter the “Juvenile Court”), signed an adjudication order in which it found that R.A. had engaged in delinquent conduct. On the same day, after a disposition hearing, the trial court signed a disposition order in which the Juvenile Court found that R.A. was in need of rehabilitation and that the protection of the public and of R.A. required a disposition to be made. The Juvenile Court placed R.A. on probation for two years, subject to various conditions.

On the same day the Juvenile Court signed the disposition order, the Juvenile Court also signed an “Order Deferring Sex Offender Registration.” In this order, the Juvenile Court deferred its decision as to whether R.A. should be required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.¹ The Juvenile Court stated that the period of deferment would expire upon R.A.'s completion of probation or release or parole by the Texas Youth Commission.² The record indicates that R.A.'s probation ended in March 2010, when he was seventeen years old.

In October 2010, the State filed a motion in which it requested that the Juvenile Court order R.A. to register as a sex offender pursuant to subchapter H of Chapter 62. The State asserted that registration protects the public and that any potential increase in protection of the public resulting from registration of R.A. is not clearly outweighed by the anticipated substantial harm to R.A. and R.A.'s family resulting from registration. R.A. objected to and opposed the State's motion, asserting that the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over R.A. ended when he completed probation in March 2010, and that the State waived its right to request registration by failing to request an order requiring registration until seven and a half months after R.A. completed probation.

The Juvenile Court held a hearing on the State's motion in February 2011. At the hearing, the State called as witnesses R.A.'s probation officer, the probation department's psychology supervisor, and a therapist who ran a treatment group that R.A. attended. The probation department recommended that R.A. be required to register. R.A. called as witnesses his mother, grandmother, grandfather, and his private therapist. His relatives testified that he had made marked improvements in his behavior and that registration would be harmful. His therapist testified that R.A. had made lots of changes and that he was not a threat to society. His therapist recommended that he not be required to register.

In June 2011, when R.A. was eighteen years old, the Juvenile Court signed an order in which it found as follows:

- The protection of the public would be increased by R.A. registering under Chapter 62;
- Any potential increase in protection of the public resulting from registration of R.A. is not clearly outweighed by any anticipated substantial harm to R.A. and R.A.'s family that would result from registration under Chapter 62;
- R.A. did not successfully participate in or complete the required sex-offender-treatment program; and
- The interests of the public require R.A. to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62.

The Juvenile Court ordered that R.A. register as a sex offender under Chapter 62 and that this sex-offender registration be private. In addition, the trial court ordered that "said registration shall be reconsidered by this Court 12 months from the date of this Order." R.A. appealed this order (the "First Order"), generating this appeal.³

While R.A.'s appeal was pending in this court, the trial court, acting sua sponte, held a hearing to consider whether it should change the registration requirement in the First Order. The second hearing occurred in March 2013, twenty months after the Juvenile Court signed the First Order. In April 2013, when R.A. was twenty years old, the Juvenile Court signed an order (the "Second Order") in which the court ordered R.A. to continue to register privately as a sex offender. R.A. has not filed a notice of appeal from the Second Order.

Before the Juvenile Court issued the Second Order, this court granted the State and R.A.'s request that this appeal be abated pending the trial court's second hearing and order, given that the Second Order might moot this appeal. After the trial court signed the Second Order, this appeal was reinstated. The State and R.A. have filed supplemental briefing. In his supplemental briefing, R.A. continues to assert his prior challenges to the First Order. In addition, R.A. challenges the Second Order, arguing that the Juvenile Court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at the second hearing and in ordering that R.A. continue with the private sex-offender registration.

Held: Affirmed

Opinion: Before addressing R.A.'s issues, we first must address this court's jurisdiction over the appeal. R.A. filed a notice of appeal in June 2011. Two days later, the trial court signed the First Order. In that order, the trial court stated that in twelve months it would reconsider its order requiring private registration by R.A. Consistent with this statement, the trial court, acting sua sponte, held a hearing in March 2013, to consider whether it should change the registration requirement in the First Order. In April 2013, the trial court signed the Second Order, declining to change the registration requirement in the First Order. Neither R.A. nor the State filed a notice of appeal from the Second Order.

R.A. asserts that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction over the First Order. If the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction over the First Order, this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal from the First Order. See *Curry v. Harris County Appraisal District*, 434 S.W.3d 815, 820 & n.2 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). A juvenile adjudicated of delinquent conduct based on the offense of aggravated sexual assault or the offense of indecency with a child generally is required to register as a sex offender. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 62.001(5), 62.051 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). But, the person adjudicated of such delinquent conduct may move the juvenile court in which he was adjudicated for an exemption from the registration requirement. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.351(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). If such a motion is filed, the juvenile court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the interests of the public require registration under Chapter 62.

Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.351(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). After such a hearing, the juvenile court shall enter an order exempting the movant from registration under Chapter 62 if the court determines that (1) the protection of the public would not be increased by registration of the movant under this chapter; or (2) any potential increase in protection of the public resulting from registration of the respondent is clearly outweighed by the anticipated substantial harm to the movant and the movant's family that would result from registration under Chapter 62. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.352(a) (West 2006). After this hearing, the juvenile court also may enter an order in which the court (1) defers a decision on requiring registration under Chapter 62 until the movant has completed treatment for the movant's sexual offense as a condition of probation or while committed to the Texas Youth Commission; or (2) requires the movant to register as a sex offender but provides that the registration information is not public information and is restricted to use by law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, the Council on Sex Offender Treatment, and public or private institutions of higher education. See *id.* art. 62.352(b).

If the juvenile court enters an order in which it defers a decision on requiring registration, the court retains discretion and jurisdiction to require, or exempt the movant from, registration under Chapter 62 "at any time during the treatment or on the successful or unsuccessful completion of the treatment," except that during the period of deferral, registration may not be required. *Id.* art. 62.352(c). Following successful completion of treatment, the movant is exempted from registration under this chapter unless a hearing under this subchapter is held on motion of the state, regardless of whether respondent is eighteen years of age or older, and the court determines the interests of the public require registration. See *id.* On the same day the Juvenile Court signed the disposition order, the Juvenile Court also signed a deferral order, stating that the State and R.A. both agreed that the court should defer its decision as to whether R.A. should be required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62 until after R.A. had participated in or completed a sex-offender treatment program while on court-ordered probation. The Juvenile Court deferred its decision as to whether R.A. should be required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62 until R.A. had participated in or completed a sex-offender treatment program while on probation or while committed to the Texas Youth Commission, if ever so committed. The Juvenile Court stated that the period of deferment would expire upon R.A.'s completion of probation or release or parole by the Texas Youth Commission. In the order, the Juvenile Court also stated that it retained discretion to require or excuse registration at any time during the treatment program or upon its successful or unsuccessful completion. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to render this order, which was a valid order under article 62.352(b)(1), in which the Juvenile Court deferred consideration of this issue until R.A.'s completion of probation or release or parole by the Texas Youth Commission. *Id.* art. 62.352(b)(1). R.A. was not committed to the Texas Youth Commission, and the record indicates that he completed probation in March 2010. R.A. does not contend otherwise; rather, he argues that the Juvenile Court lost jurisdiction because the State did not move the Juvenile Court to decide whether R.A. should be required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62 until seven and a half months after R.A. completed probation and the deferral period ended.

We conclude that the State filed its motion under article 62.352(c). *Id.* art. 62.352(b)(1).

First Order Opinion:

We now address whether the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction to rule on this motion and to decide whether R.A. should be required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62 in June 2011, more than fifteen months after R.A. completed probation and after R.A. had turned eighteen years old.

Before we address this specific issue, we consider the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in *In re N.J.A.* and general principles regarding the jurisdiction of a juvenile court. See *In re N.J.A.*, 997 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.1999). In *In re N.J.A.*, the high court concluded that a juvenile court is not a court of general jurisdiction. See *id.* at 555. The N.J.A. court construed the version of Family Code section 54.05(b) that was applicable to that case to mean that a juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a disposition or adjudication hearing after the respondent is eighteen years old. See *id.* The N.J.A. court concluded that, when a respondent turns eighteen, the juvenile court's jurisdiction is limited to transferring the case to the appropriate district court or criminal district court or dismissing the case. See *id.* at 555–56. The N.J.A. court did not address Family Code section 51.042, which then, as now, provided that if a child does not object to the juvenile court's lack of jurisdiction due to the child's age at the adjudication hearing or discretionary-transfer hearing, the child waives the right to object to the juvenile court's lack of jurisdiction based on the child's age at a later hearing, or on appeal. See *id.* The *In re N.J.A.* court held that, because the respondent in that case turned eighteen before the disposition hearing, the juvenile court's jurisdiction was limited to transferring the case to the appropriate district court or criminal district court or to dismissing the case but that the court lacked jurisdiction to render an adjudication or disposition order. See *id.*

It might appear that the *In re N.J.A.* court concluded that once a respondent turns eighteen, the juvenile court only has jurisdiction to transfer the case to the appropriate district court or criminal district court or to dismiss the case. See *id.* The better reading of this precedent, however, is that the high court concluded that (1) juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, rather than general jurisdiction; (2) therefore, their jurisdiction must be based on an applicable statute; and (3) under the statutes applicable in *In re N.J.A.*, the juvenile court only had jurisdiction to transfer the case to the appropriate district court or criminal district court or to dismiss the case. See *id.*

Subsequent cases support this view of *In re N.J.A.* See *In re B.R.H.*, 426 S.W.3d 163, 166–68 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding); *In re T.A.W.*, 234 S.W.3d 704, 705 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). In *In re T.A.W.*, the adjudication hearing did not begin until after the respondent had turned eighteen. See *In re T.A.W.*, 234 S.W.3d at 705. This court cited *In re N.J.A.* for the proposition that, although a juvenile court does not lose jurisdiction when a juvenile turns eighteen, such jurisdiction is generally limited to either transferring the case under Family Code section 54.02(j) or dismissing the case. See *id.* Although the juvenile court in *In re T.A.W.* conducted the adjudication hearing after the respondent had turned eighteen, this court did not conclude, as the *In re N.J.A.* court did, that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to conduct an adjudication hearing or render an adjudication order; rather, this court affirmed the trial court's adjudication order after concluding that the respondent had waived any objection to the trial court's lack of jurisdiction by failing to object at the adjudication hearing, as required by Family Code section 51.042. See Tex. Family Code Ann. § 51.042 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Thus, the *In re T.A.W.* court interpreted *In re N.J.A.* as requiring that the applicable statutes be construed to determine whether the trial court's order could be reversed for lack of jurisdiction. See *In re T.A.W.*, 234 S.W.3d at 705.

Likewise, in *In re B.R.H.*, the court of appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss, and retaining for adjudication, a petition alleging delinquent conduct against a respondent who had turned eighteen. See *In re B.R.H.*, 426 S.W.3d at 166–68. The court based its ruling on Family Code section 51.0412, which was enacted after *In re N.J.A.* was decided. See Tex.

Family Code Ann. § 51.0412 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (providing that a juvenile court retains jurisdiction over a person, without regard to the age of the person, who is a respondent in an adjudication proceeding, a disposition proceeding, a proceeding to modify disposition, a proceeding for waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to criminal court under section 54.02(a), or a motion for transfer of determinate sentence probation to an appropriate district court under certain circumstances). The *In re B.R.H.* court correctly concluded that to the extent *In re N.J.A.* indicates that a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a disposition or adjudication hearing that falls within the scope of section 51.0412 after the respondent turns eighteen, Family Code section 51.0412 supersedes that decision. See *Tex. Family Code Ann. § 51.0412; In re B.R.H.*, 426 S.W.3d at 167.

A juvenile adjudicated of delinquent conduct based on one of the offenses listed in article 62.001(5) (including the offenses of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child) is required to register as a sex offender unless exempted from registration under subchapter H of Chapter 62. See *Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 62.001(5), 62.051, 62.351, et seq.* Under Texas Family Code section 54.05(a), various dispositions, including R.A.'s disposition, may not be modified on or after the child's eighteenth birthday. See *Tex. Family Code Ann. § 54.05(a), 54.05(a)* (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). Under Texas Family Code section 54.05(b), various dispositions, including R.A.'s disposition, automatically terminate on the child's eighteenth birthday. See *Tex. Family Code Ann. § 54.05(b)*. Nonetheless, the duty to register as a sex offender arises from Chapter 62, and R.A.'s duty to register or any exemption therefrom is not part of the disposition that terminated on R.A.'s eighteenth birthday.⁴

Though it may be unusual for the Legislature to expand the jurisdiction of a juvenile court by enacting new provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that is what has occurred in subchapter H of Chapter 62. See *Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.351, et seq.; In re J.M.*, 2011 WL 6000778, at *1–3. The Legislature enacted these statutes after the Supreme Court of Texas's decision in *In re N.J.A.* See *In re N.J.A.*, 997 S.W.2d at 555–56. Thus, if the Juvenile Court acted under the authority of article 62.352 when it issued the First Order, the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction to do so. See *Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.352; In re J.M.*, 2011 WL 6000778, at *1–3. To the extent *In re N.J.A.* indicated that after the respondent turns eighteen, a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether a respondent should be required to register as a sex offender, subchapter H of Chapter 62 has superseded that decision. See *Tex. Family Code Ann. § 51.0412; In re B.R.H.*, 426 S.W.3d at 167. To the extent subchapter H of Chapter 62 provides the juvenile court authority to act and *In re N.J.A.* indicates that the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction because the respondent is eighteen or older, subchapter H of Chapter 62 has superseded *In re N.J.A.* See *Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.351, et seq.; In re B.R.H.*, 426 S.W.3d at 167; *In re J.M.*, 2011 WL 6000778, at *1–3.

Thus, we must determine whether the Juvenile Court acted under the authority of article 62.352. This statute provides in pertinent part as follows:

(b) After a hearing under Article 62.351 or under a plea agreement described by Article 62.355(b), the juvenile court may enter an order:

(1) deferring decision on requiring registration under this chapter until the respondent has completed treatment for the respondent's sexual offense as a condition of probation or while committed to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department; or

(2) requiring the respondent to register as a sex offender but providing that the registration information is not public information and is restricted to use by law enforcement and criminal

justice agencies, the Council on Sex Offender Treatment, and public or private institutions of higher education.

(c) If the court enters an order described by Subsection (b)(1), the court retains discretion and jurisdiction to require, or exempt the respondent from, registration under this chapter at any time during the treatment or on the successful or unsuccessful completion of treatment, except that during the period of deferral, registration may not be required. Following successful completion of treatment, the respondent is exempted from registration under this chapter unless a hearing under this subchapter is held on motion of the prosecuting attorney, regardless of whether the respondent is 18 years of age or older, and the court determines the interests of the public require registration. Not later than the 10th day after the date of the respondent's successful completion of treatment, the treatment provider shall notify the juvenile court and prosecuting attorney of the completion. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.352.

We review the trial court's interpretation of applicable statutes *de novo*. See *Johnson v. City of Fort Worth*, 774 S.W.2d 653, 655–56 (Tex.1989). In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. See *Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen*, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex.2000). If possible, we must ascertain that intent from the language the Legislature used in the statute and not look to extraneous matters for an intent the statute does not state. *Id.* If the meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, we adopt the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision's words. *St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor*, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex.1997). We must not engage in forced or strained construction; instead, we must yield to the plain sense of the words the Legislature chose. See *id.*

Under the unambiguous language of article 62.352(c), the Juvenile Court had discretion and jurisdiction to require, or exempt R.A. from registration under Chapter 62 "on the successful or unsuccessful completion of treatment." Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.352. The statute provides that, following successful completion of treatment, the respondent is exempted from registration as a sex offender unless a hearing under subchapter H of Chapter 62 is held on the motion of the prosecuting attorney. See *id.* Though article 62.352(c) provides jurisdiction to the juvenile court to require registration or exempt from registration on the successful or unsuccessful completion of treatment, the statute does not mention a presumed outcome or motion by the State if the respondent unsuccessfully completes treatment. See *id.* Nonetheless, a sister court has held that, even if the respondent unsuccessfully completes treatment, the State still may move for a hearing under article 62.352(c) and the juvenile court still may require registration under this statute. In *re J.M.*, 2011 WL 6000778, at *1–3. We agree that, even if R.A. unsuccessfully completed treatment, the State still may move for a hearing under article 62.352(c) and the juvenile court still may require registration under this statute. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.352(c); In *re J.M.*, 2011 WL 6000778, at *1–3.

On appeal, R.A. asserts that he successfully completed treatment and that under article 62.352(c) he was exempted from registration as a sex offender unless a hearing was held on motion of the prosecuting attorney. According to R.A, he successfully completed treatment on March 14, 2010. The State did not move for a hearing until October 29, 2010, seven and a half months later. R.A. asserts that the State's motion had to be filed "very soon after" March 14, 2010, for the Juvenile Court to have jurisdiction under article 62.352(c). Because seven and a half months later is not "very soon after," R.A. claims that the Juvenile Court no longer could exercise jurisdiction.

In the First Order, the Juvenile Court specifically found that R.A. “did not successfully participate in and/or complete the required sex-offender treatment program.” R.A. has not challenged this finding on appeal. Even so, we need not decide whether R.A. successfully completed treatment because we conclude that, whether or not R.A. successfully completed treatment, the State still had the ability to file a motion requesting a hearing on the issue of whether R.A. should be required to register as a sex offender. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.352(c); In re J.M., 2011 WL 6000778, at *1–3.

As to the seven-and-a-half-month delay by the State in moving for a hearing, the interests of R.A. and of the public are best served by a motion by the State either during treatment or promptly thereafter. Nonetheless, the statute does not provide a specific deadline for the State to file a motion or for a hearing to be held.

Conclusion to First Order: We conclude that the seven-and-a-half month delay did not cause the Juvenile Court to lose jurisdiction to determine whether R.A. should be required to register as a sex offender. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 62.351, 62.352(c); In re J.M., 2011 WL 6000778, at *1–3 (holding that juvenile court had jurisdiction to require respondent to register privately as a sex offender, in case in which State did not file motion for hearing until four and a half months after respondent unsuccessfully completed treatment). We conclude that, under articles 62.351 and 62.352(c) the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction to determine whether R.A. should be required to register as a sex offender and whether this registration should be public or private. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 62.351, 62.352(c); In re J.M., 2011 WL 6000778, at *1–3.

The State has suggested that the appeal from the First Order may have become moot due to the issuance of the Second Order. As we explain below, the Second Order did not supersede the First Order. A determination by this court that the Juvenile Court erred in requiring R.A. to register privately as a sex offender would have a direct effect on R.A.’s potential criminal liability for failing to register. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 62.102 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.). R.A.’s appeal from the First Order is not moot.

Second Order Opinion: At the hearing in which the trial court issued the First Order, the Juvenile Court indicated it would revisit the issue in a year. Then, in the First Order, the Juvenile Court stated that its registration order would be “reconsidered” twelve months from the date of the First Order. R.A. timely appealed from the First Order. While R.A.’s appeal was pending in this court, the trial court, acting sua sponte, held a hearing to consider whether it should change the registration requirement in the First Order. The second hearing occurred in March 2013, twenty months after the Juvenile Court signed the First Order. In April 2013, the Juvenile Court signed the Second Order, in which the court ordered R.A. to continue to register privately as a sex offender. Before the Juvenile Court issued the Second Order, this court granted the State’s and R.A.’s request to abate this appeal pending the trial court’s second hearing and order. R.A. has not filed a notice of appeal from the Second Order. After the trial court signed the Second Order, this court reinstated the appeal. A supplemental record relating to the Second Order has been filed with this court, and this court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing.

R.A. filed a supplemental brief asserting issues challenging the Second Order. In its supplemental brief, the State questions whether this court has appellate jurisdiction to review the Second Order. R.A. asserts that this court has jurisdiction over the Second Order because he prematurely filed a

notice of appeal or because the Second Order is a modification of the First Order under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.3.

R.A. argues that he did not need to file a second notice of appeal because his appeal from the First Order was a timely appeal of a final order. In the context of the procedures provided in subchapter H of Chapter 62, the First Order was a final order in which the Juvenile Court actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court. See *Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.*, 39 S.W.3d 191, 192, 200 (Tex.2001) (providing that a judgment that issues without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court or states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment). R.A. timely appealed from the First Order, and this court has jurisdiction over this appeal and R.A.'s challenges to the First Order.⁵

R.A. asserts that, if the First Order is interlocutory, then R.A. filed an effective premature notice of appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.1(a), but the First Order is a final order and R.A. filed a notice of appeal from the First Order, not the Second Order. Though R.A. perfected an appeal from the First Order by filing a premature notice of appeal under Rule 27.1(a) two days before the Juvenile Court rendered the First Order, we cannot construe this notice of appeal as a premature notice of appeal from the Second Order, which the trial court rendered twenty-one months later. See *Tex.R.App. P. 27.1(a)*.

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.3 provides:

After an order or judgment in a civil case has been appealed, if the trial court modifies the order or judgment, or if the trial court vacates the order or judgment and replaces it with another appealable order or judgment, the appellate court must treat the appeal as from the subsequent order or judgment and may treat actions relating to the appeal of the first order or judgment as relating to the appeal of the subsequent order or judgment. The subsequent order or judgment and actions relating to it may be included in the original or supplemental record. Any party may nonetheless appeal from the subsequent order or judgment. *Tex.R.App. P. 27.3*.

In the Second Order, the trial court found that the interests of the public required that R.A. continue to register privately as a sex offender under Chapter 62 and that R.A.'s Texas Juvenile Sex Offender Risk Assessment, previously determined to be "high risk," should be reduced to "moderate risk." In the Second Order, the Juvenile Court then ordered that R.A. continue to register privately as a sex offender under Chapter 62 and that R.A.'s Texas Juvenile Sex Offender Risk Assessment should be reduced to "moderate risk."

The Second Order did not vacate or replace the Juvenile Court's First Order, nor did the Second Order modify the First Order. In the Second Order, the Juvenile Court evaluated whether or not the interests of the public required that R.A. continue to register privately as a sex offender at the time of the Second Order. The Juvenile Court did not address whether the interests of the public required that R.A. register privately as a sex offender at the time of the First Order or whether the First Order should be modified, vacated, or replaced. In the First Order, the trial court ordered R.A. to register privately as a sex offender under Chapter 62 and did not address R.A.'s Texas Juvenile Sex Offender Risk Assessment. In the Second Order, the trial court ordered R.A. to continue to register privately as a sex offender under Chapter 62 and reduced R.A.'s Texas Juvenile Sex Offender Risk to "moderate risk." Though the trial court may have modified R.A.'s risk assessment, that risk assessment was not contained

in the First Order; therefore, the order reducing the risk assessment did not modify the First Order. Because the Juvenile Court did not modify, vacate, or replace the First Order in the Second Order, we conclude that this court does not have jurisdiction over the Second Order under Rule 27.3. See Tex.R.App. P. 27.3.

Conclusion to Second Order: Because no notice of appeal has been filed from the Second Order and because there is no other basis for this court to exercise appellate jurisdiction, we conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction over the Second Order and R.A.'s issues challenging that order.⁶ See *Overka v. Bauri*, No. 14-06-00083-CV, 2006 WL 2074688 at *1 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jul. 27, 2006, no pet.) (mem.op.).