

Review of Recent Juvenile Cases (2008)

by
The Honorable Pat Garza
Associate Judge
386th District Court
San Antonio, Texas

A violation of Miranda Warnings does not justify the exclusion of physical evidence resulting therefrom.[In the Matter of H.V.](08-2-11)

On April 11, 2008, the Texas Supreme Court held that physical evidence that does not compel a defendant to testify against himself cannot be a violation of the Fifth Amendment rights that *Miranda* protects against, and if obtaining the evidence did not violate the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure the evidence is admissible.

¶ 08-2-11. *In the Matter of H.V.*, __S.W.3d.__, No. 06-0005, 2008 WL 1147567, (Tex.Sup.Ct., 4/11/08).

Facts: Evidence presented at the suppression hearing here showed that sixteen-year-old H.V. bought a gun on September 7, 2003. Two days later he was seen leaving North Crowley High School with Daniel Oltmanns. The next day, Oltmanns's body was found at a construction site with wounds indicating he had been shot in the head.

The following morning, a police detective met with H.V. at the high school and asked him to accompany her downtown for questioning. He agreed and was taken to a juvenile processing center. After receiving the required warnings from a magistrate, [\[FN2\]](#) H.V. waived his rights and gave a statement admitting he had bought a gun but claiming he had returned it before Oltmanns was shot. The statement was typed up and H.V. signed it, after which he was returned to school.

[FN2.](#) *See id.* § 51.095(a)(1) (providing that children be warned of their rights by a magistrate); *see also In re R.J.H.*, 79 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.2002) ("The Texas Family Code provides that a juvenile can waive his rights once he is in custody only if joined by his attorney or if done in the presence of a magistrate.").

That afternoon, police officers visited H.V. and his father at their home and asked them to leave the premises pending arrival of a search warrant. They did so, but shortly thereafter H.V. returned, and an off-duty policeman saw him carrying a bloodstained carpet over the back fence of the home. H.V. was arrested on a charge of evidence tampering, and again taken to the juvenile processing facility where he was again given warnings by a magistrate. [\[FN3\]](#)

[FN3.](#) The State concedes that if H.V.'s statements to the magistrate constitute an invocation of his right to counsel, it is immaterial that it was not also made to police.

When asked whether he wanted to waive his rights and speak to police, H.V. said he wanted to speak to his mother, but was told he could not. H.V. then responded that he "wanted his mother to ask for an attorney." When the magistrate responded that only he (not his mother) could ask for an attorney, H.V. replied, "But, I'm

only sixteen." The magistrate then reiterated that only he could ask for an attorney, after which H.V. eventually said he would talk to the police. In a second written statement, H.V. claimed Oltmanns accidentally shot himself with H.V.'s gun, after which H.V. placed him in a bathtub where he bled to death. Based on a drawing by H.V., police recovered the gun from a storm sewer close to H.V.'s home.

Finding that H.V. had invoked his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the trial court suppressed both H.V.'s second written statement and the gun, and the court of appeals affirmed. [\[FN4\]](#) The State brings this appeal from a juvenile court order suppressing evidence in a case involving a violent offender. [\[FN5\]](#) As this question does not turn on an evaluation of demeanor or credibility (as discussed below), we review the question de novo. [\[FN6\]](#)

Held: Affirmed in part, reversed in part

Opinion: *Miranda v. Arizona* requires that suspects in custody be informed before questioning begins of their right to consult with an attorney. [\[FN32\]](#) If a suspect invokes that right, there can be no further interrogation unless the accused initiates it. [\[FN33\]](#) If Miranda warnings are not given or a request for counsel is ignored, any subsequent statements by the suspect cannot be introduced at trial during the prosecution's case-in-chief. [\[FN34\]](#)

[FN32. 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 \(1966\)](#) ("[T]he right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today.... Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires."); see [U.S. CONST. amend. V](#) ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....").

[FN33. *Edwards v. Arizona*, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 \(1981\).](#)

[FN34. *Davis v. United States*, 512 U.S. 452, 458 \(1994\); *Edwards*, 451 U.S. at 487; *Miranda*, 384 U.S. at 479.](#)

These rights apply to juveniles just as they do to adults. [\[FN35\]](#) Thus, the State concedes in this case that if H.V. properly invoked his right to counsel, the second statement he made thereafter should be suppressed. The only dispute is whether he invoked that right.

[FN35. *In re R.J.H.*, 79 S.W.3d 1, 4 \(Tex.2002\)](#) (citing [In re Gault](#), 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967)).

In *Davis v. United States*, the United States Supreme Court established a "bright line" between suspects who *might* be asking for a lawyer and those who actually *do* ask for one, holding that only the latter have invoked their right to counsel:

To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry. Invocation of the *Miranda* right to counsel requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney. But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect *might* be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. As we have observed, a statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not. Although a suspect need not speak with the discrimination of an

Oxford don, he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. [\[FN36\]](#)

[FN36. *Davis*, 512 U.S. at 458-59](#) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (italics in original).

Applying this standard, courts have held that it is not enough for a suspect to say:

- "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer"; [\[FN37\]](#)

[FN37. *Id.*; accord, *Dinkins v. State*, 894 S.W.2d 330, 352 \(Tex.Crim.App.1995\)](#) ("Maybe I should talk to someone").

- "I might want to talk to an attorney"; [\[FN38\]](#)

[FN38. *United States v. Zamora*, 222 F.3d 756, 765-66 \(10th Cir.2000\).](#)

- "I think I need a lawyer"; [\[FN39\]](#)

[FN39. *Burket v. Angelone*, 208 F.3d 172, 198 \(4th Cir.2000\).](#)

- "Do you think I need an attorney here?"; [\[FN40\]](#) or

[FN40. *Mueller v. Angelone*, 181 F.3d 557, 573-74 \(4th Cir.1999\); accord, *Soffar v. Cockrell*, 300 F.3d 588, 595 \(5th Cir.2002\); *Diaz v. Senkowski*, 76 F.3d 61, 63-65 \(2d Cir.1996\).](#)

- "I can't afford a lawyer but is there anyway I can get one?" [\[FN41\]](#)

[FN41. *Lord v. Duckworth*, 29 F.3d 1216, 1219-21 \(7th Cir.1994\); accord, *Soffar*, 300 F.3d at 595.](#)

Nor is it enough for a suspect to ask to see someone other than a lawyer, such as a probation officer, [\[FN42\]](#) or a parent. [\[FN43\]](#)

[FN42. *Fare v. Michael C.*, 442 U.S. 707, 724 \(1979\).](#)

[FN43. *Dewberry v. State*, 4 S.W.3d 735, 747 \(Tex.Crim.App.1999\); *Randall v. State*, 712 S.W.2d 631, 632 \(Tex.App.-Beaumont 1986, pet. ref'd\).](#)

At the same time, a suspect does not have to use the precise words "I want a lawyer." [\[FN44\]](#) Courts have held the right to counsel was invoked when a suspect said:

[FN44. *Montoya v. Collins*, 955 F.2d 279, 283 \(5th Cir.1992\)](#) ("This holding does not require a defendant to utter the magic words, 'I want a lawyer,' in order to assert his right to counsel."); [Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 747 n. 9](#) ("There are no magic words required to invoke an accused's right to counsel.").

- he did not "want to make a statement at this time without a lawyer"; [\[FN45\]](#)

[FN45. *United States v. Johnson*, 400 F.3d 187, 195 \(4th Cir.2005\).](#)

- "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that" in response to a question whether he understood his right to counsel; [\[FN46\]](#)

[FN46. *Smith v. Illinois*, 469 U.S. 91, 93, 99-100 \(1984\).](#)

- "Maybe I should talk to an attorney by the name of William Evans" and proffering that attorney's business card; [\[FN47\]](#)

[FN47. *Abela v. Martin*, 380 F.3d 915, 919, 926-27 \(6th Cir.2004\).](#)

- "Can I get an attorney right now, man?"; [\[FN48\]](#) or

[FN48. *Alvarez v. Gomez*, 185 F.3d 995, 998 \(9th Cir.1999\).](#)

- "I'd just as soon have an attorney 'cause, you know--ya'll say there's been a shooting." [\[FN49\]](#)

[FN49. *Kygerv. Carlton*, 146 F.3d 374, 376, 379 \(6th Cir.1998\).](#)

While police often carry printed cards to ensure precise *Miranda* warnings, [\[FN50\]](#) the public is not required to carry similar cards so they can give similarly precise responses.

[FN50. See, e.g., *Oregon v. Elstad*, 470 U.S. 298, 314-15 & n. 4 \(1985\); *Arabzadeqan v. State*, 240 S.W.3d 44, 46 \(Tex.App.-Austin 2007, pet. ref'd\); *Fineron v. State*, 201 S.W.3d 361, 364 \(Tex.App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.\).](#)

The parties here disagree whether *Davis* requires us to consider H. V.'s circumstances--his youth, Bosnian extraction, and lack of previous experience with police. On this issue, the Court's opinion in *Davis* gives somewhat mixed signals. On the one hand, the Court said a statement must be "sufficiently clear [] that a reasonable police officer *in the circumstances* would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." [\[FN51\]](#) But the Court also said invocation should not turn on the suspect's personal characteristics:

[FN51. *Davis v. United States*, 512 U.S. 452, 459 \(1994\)](#) (emphasis added).

We recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who--because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons--will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present. [\[FN52\]](#)

[FN52. *Id.*](#) at 460.

There appear to be no cases answering whether a juvenile's age is among the "variety of other reasons" courts cannot consider when deciding whether an accused has requested counsel. Long before *Davis*, the Supreme Court held that "a juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and ... capacity to understand the warnings" must be considered when deciding whether a juvenile waived *Miranda* rights. [\[FN53\]](#) As the question here is not whether H.V. *waived* his right to counsel but whether he *invoked* it, it is not entirely clear which rule applies.

[FN53. *Fare v. Michael C.*, 442 U.S. 707, 725 \(1979\); see *Delao v. State*, 235 S.W.3d 235 \(Tex.Crim.App.2007\).](#)

But we need not decide in this case whether the court of appeals erred in considering H. V.'s age, as we agree with its ultimate conclusion. It is hard to construe H.V.'s statement that he "wanted his mother to ask for an attorney" as anything other than "an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney." [\[FN54\]](#) This is not a case in which H.V. simply wanted to see his mother; the only reason he said he wanted her was for the purpose of getting him an attorney. If he wanted private counsel, his request would have been technically correct, as his age at least hindered if it did not prevent him from doing so himself. [\[FN55\]](#)

[FN54. *Davis*, 512 U.S. at 459.](#)

[FN55. See *In re D.A.S.*, 951 S.W.2d 528, 529 \(Tex.App.-Dallas 1997\)](#) ("[A] minor does not have the legal capacity to employ an attorney"), *rev'd on other grounds*, 973 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1998); *accord*, [Lee v. Colorado City, Texas](#), No. 04-CV-00028, 2004 WL 524923 *2 n. 2 (N.D.Tex. Mar. 4, 2004); [Francine v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.](#), No. 02-CV1853, 2003 WL 21501838, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2003); [Byrd v. Woodruff](#), 891 S.W.2d 689, 704 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied); [In re Martel](#), No. 12-06-00397-CV, 2007 WL 43616, at *3 (Tex.App.-Tyler Jan. 8, 2007, orig. proceeding); [Coleson v. Bethan](#), 931 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ); *see also* [Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Roman](#), 498 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. 1973) (holding contract of a minor, while not void, is voidable at minor's election). The dissent cites a nineteenth-century case for the rule that a minor can employ an attorney as a "necessary" because "it would be unreasonable to deny him the power to secure the means of defending himself." [Askey v. Williams](#), 11 S.W. 1101, 1101 (Tex. 1889). We need not decide today whether that case survives the rule announced 78 years later that juveniles have a constitutional right to counsel, *see In re Gault*, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); we merely note that it remains the duty of a parent in the first instance to pay for such necessities. *See* [Tex. Fam.Code § 151.001\(c\)](#) ("A parent who fails to discharge the duty of support is liable to a person who provides necessities to those to whom support is owed.").

This case is a close one because, when the magistrate followed up by instructing H.V. that only he could ask for an appointed attorney, H.V. never did. But while ambiguous requests for counsel may be clarified by further questioning, [\[FN56\]](#) unambiguous ones cannot:

[FN56. *Davis*, 512 U.S. at 453.](#)

No authority, and no logic, permits the interrogator to proceed ... on his own terms and as if the defendant had requested nothing, in the hope that the defendant might be induced to say something casting retrospective doubt on his initial statement that he wished to speak through an attorney or not at all. [\[FN57\]](#)

[FN57. *Smith v. Illinois*, 469 U.S. 91, 98-99 \(1984\).](#)

As the objective circumstances surrounding H.V.'s statement rendered it an unambiguous request for an attorney, further "clarification" could not change it.

Accordingly, we agree with the courts below that H.V.'s second statement to the police was properly suppressed.

The court of appeals held that suppression of H.V.'s statement also required suppression of the gun as "fruits of the poisonous tree," a legal doctrine first recognized in the context of the Fourth Amendment. [\[FN58\]](#) But both the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have rejected this doctrine in the Fifth Amendment context of physical evidence obtained after failing to give *Miranda* warnings. [\[FN59\]](#)

[FN58. *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471, 487 \(1963\); *Kothe v. State*, 152 S.W.3d 54, 60 \(Tex.Crim.App.2004\); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV \("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...."\).](#)

[FN59. *United States v. Patane*, 542 U.S. 630, 634 \(2004\) \(plurality opinion\); *id.* at 645 \(Kennedy, J., concurring\); *Baker v. State*, 956 S.W.2d 19, 23-24 \(Tex.Crim.App.1997\).](#)

The court of appeals held otherwise, distinguishing cases in which *Miranda* rights were not read from cases like this one in which an invocation of those rights was ignored. [\[FN60\]](#) That distinction was expressly rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeals in *Baker v. State*:

[FN60. 179 S.W.3d 746, 758.](#)

Both *Tucker* [[FN61](#)] and *Elstad* [[FN62](#)] involved the failure to give the required warnings rather than the failure to scrupulously honor warnings given. Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has addressed whether the *Tucker/Elstad* rule applies to the fruits of statements made in the latter context. But the principle is the same: mere noncompliance with *Miranda* does not result in a carryover taint beyond the statement itself.... We hold that the *Tucker/Elstad* rule applies to the failure to scrupulously honor the invocation of *Miranda* rights. In the absence of actual coercion, the fruits of a statement taken in violation of *Miranda* need not be suppressed under the "fruits" doctrine.... [\[FN63\]](#)

[FN61. *Michigan v. Tucker*, 417 U.S. 433 \(1974\).](#)

[FN62. *Oregon v. Elstad*, 470 U.S. 298 \(1985\).](#)

[FN63. *Baker*, 956 S.W.2d at 23-24.](#)

The court of appeals pointed out that *Elstad* made a distinction between unread rights and ignored rights in a footnote. [\[FN64\]](#) But *Elstad* was not based on that distinction, but on reasoning that *Miranda* does not involve a constitutional violation. [\[FN65\]](#) The court of appeals also pointed out that in 2000 the Supreme Court abandoned its characterization of *Miranda* as a prophylactic rather than a constitutional rule. [\[FN66\]](#) But the Court held four years later that this did not change the rule that physical evidence was admissible even if gained from questioning that violated *Miranda*. [\[FN67\]](#)

[FN64. See *Elstad*, 470 U.S. at 312-13 n. 3 \(stating that as current case involved mere failure to give *Miranda* warnings, "\[I\]f likewise inapposite are the cases the dissent cites concerning suspects whose invocation of their rights to remain silent and to have counsel present were flatly ignored while police subjected them to continued interrogation"\). But see *Oregon v. Hass*, 420 U.S. 714, 723 \(1975\) \(refusing to distinguish between unread rights and ignored rights when allowing statements that violate *Miranda* to be used for impeachment\).](#)

[FN65](#). See [Eldred, 470 U.S. at 306-07](#) ("[A] procedural *Miranda* violation differs in significant respects from violations of the Fourth Amendment.... The *Miranda* exclusionary rule, however, serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself ... *Miranda*'s preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.").

[FN66](#). See [Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 \(2000\)](#) ("In sum, we conclude that *Miranda* announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.").

[FN67](#). See [United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643 \(2004\)](#) (plurality opinion); [id. at 645](#) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

More relevant to the question here is a different principle stated by the Supreme Court in *Eldred* and since: the Self-Incrimination Clause concerns compelled testimony, not physical evidence. [\[FN68\]](#) The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;" [\[FN69\]](#) thus, there can be no Fifth Amendment violation when a person's testimony is excluded. [\[FN70\]](#) Physical evidence that does not compel a defendant to testify against himself cannot be a violation of the Fifth Amendment rights that *Miranda* protects, which is precisely what the Supreme Court held in 2004. [\[FN71\]](#)

[FN68](#). [Eldred, 470 U.S. at 304](#) ("The Fifth Amendment, of course, is not concerned with nontestimonial evidence.").

[FN69](#). [U.S. CONST., amend. V](#) (emphasis added).

[FN70](#). [Patane, 542 U.S. at 643](#) (plurality opinion) ("Introduction of the nontestimonial fruit of a voluntary statement, such as respondent's Glock, does not implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause. The admission of such fruit presents no risk that a defendant's coerced statements (however defined) will be used against him at a criminal trial."); [id. at 645](#) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Admission of nontestimonial physical fruits ... does not run the risk of admitting into trial an accused's coerced incriminating statements against himself.").

[FN71](#). [Id. at 634](#).

The court of appeals expressed concern that suppressing testimonial statements but not physical evidence might encourage police to reject a request for counsel deliberately in the hope of getting something they could use. [\[FN72\]](#) But evidence obtained through deliberate violations of constitutional rights is usually inadmissible on that basis alone. [\[FN73\]](#)

[FN72](#). [179 S.W.3d 746, 763](#); see also [Patane, 542 U.S. at 645](#) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The issue actually presented today is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest we create an incentive for the police to omit *Miranda* warnings.").

[FN73](#). [Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 620-21 \(2004\)](#) (Kennedy, J., concurring); [Patane, 542 U.S. at 639](#) (plurality opinion) (stating that fruits "of actually compelled testimony" must be excluded); [Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 \(1975\)](#) ("One might concede that when proper *Miranda* warnings have been given, and the officer then continues his interrogation after the suspect asks for an attorney, the officer may be said to have little to lose and perhaps something to gain by way of possibly uncovering impeachment material.... If, in a given case, the officer's conduct amounts to an abuse, that case, like those involving coercion or duress,

may be taken care of when it arises measured by the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and trustworthiness."); cf. [Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524 \(2004\)](#) (requiring suppression of information gained by deliberate violation of suspect's Sixth Amendment right to counsel). But see [Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423-24 \(1986\)](#) ("Granting that the 'deliberate or reckless' withholding of information is objectionable as a matter of ethics, such conduct is only relevant to the constitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.").

In this case, H.V.'s counsel does not argue that his disclosure of the gun's location was involuntary or coerced for any reason other than violation of his *Miranda* request for counsel. The warnings and invocation of counsel here all occurred in court before a magistrate without police involvement, so there could have been no police coercion. [\[FN74\]](#) Because violations of *Miranda* do not justify exclusion of physical evidence resulting therefrom, we hold the courts below erred in excluding the gun that brought about Daniel Oltmanns's death.

[FN74.](#) See [Tex. Fam.Code § 51.095\(a\)\(1\)](#) (providing for admissibility of statements by a child when a magistrate "has examined the child independent of any law enforcement officer or prosecuting attorney").

* * *

Conclusion: Accordingly, we affirm the judgments below to the extent they exclude H.V.'s second statement to police, reverse the judgments to the extent they exclude the gun found as a result, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.